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In a dynamic game between N retailers and a large number of suppliers, I show that inefficient contracting emerges as a 
mechanism to implement collusion among retailers, building on the natural ‘complementarity’ between retail and wholesale 
prices. When efficient collusion is not sustainable, this complementarity allows retailers to rely on inefficient input supply, 
entailing double marginalization and negative franchise fees, to squeeze the wedge between collusive and deviation profits. I 
also study the role of communication on the equilibrium outcomes of games where retailers have the initiative. It turns out 
that communication is indeed fundamental to strengthen cartels' sustainability, although generating efficiency losses. 
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Manufacturer-retailer relationships have been widely studied by the recent IO literature. Existing
models have underscored several important aspects of these games. For instance, by studying the
link between pre-commitment e⁄ects and renegotiation (e.g., Caillaud et al., 1995, and Katz,
1991), the rationale behind alternative forms of vertical restraints (e.g., Blair and Lewis, 1994,
Gal-Or, 1991a, Khun, 1997, Jullien and Rey, 2007, Martimort, 1996, Rey and Stiglitz, 1995,
Rey and Tirole, 1986, and Semenov and Wright, 2009), or by emphasizing the welfare e⁄ects of
non-exclusive deals (e.g., Bernheim and Whinston, 1986 and 1998, Gal-Or, 1991b, Martimort and
Stole, 2008, and Rey et al., 2008).
But this body of work has mainly taken a static approach, and has thus often neglected the
strategic aspects stemming from the intertemporal dimension of vertical contracting. Hence, the
e⁄ects of di⁄erent wholesale trading rules on the outcome of the repeated interaction between
upstream and downstream ￿rms have been poorly understood (few recent exceptions being Jullien
and Rey, 2007, Nocke and White, 2007, and Schinkel et al., 2008). This gap raises a number of
natural, yet unanswered issues that are related both to the recent antitrust debate over the
right legal attitude towards di⁄erent and evolving forms of vertical arrangements, and to the
literature on the determinants of ￿rms￿boundaries. What is the link between collusion and
vertical contracting in markets where the bargaining power is on the retailers￿side? Can the
strategic design of wholesale contracts a⁄ect competition in these games? Do public contracts
help downstream ￿rms to enforce cooperative outcomes? If so, in which markets this is more
likely to occur?
The economic relevance of these issues stems from the rise in many developed countries of big
box retailers ￿ i.e., Wal-Mart in the US and Ikea in Europe ￿ as well as from the widespread
di⁄usion of large supermarket chains.1 Scheelings and Wright (2006) point out that the growing
in￿ uence of these big retailers has led competition authorities to renew their focus on ￿ buyer
power￿ . As they observe: ￿Antitrust authorities in the United States have been investigating
￿ slotting fees￿and other retail practices, while UK and EU authorities have commenced a number
of inquiries into the competitiveness of the supermarket grocery retail sector. Some in compe-
tition policy circles in the United States and Europe claim that there is something su¢ ciently
special about market power on the buyer side of vertically-related industries as to warrant special
antitrust scrutiny or a separate analytical framework altogether.￿
1As argued in Rey et al. (2008), large supermarket chains often account for a high share of a manufacturer￿ s
production: in the UK, even large manufacturers typically rely on their main buyer for more than 30 percent of
domestic sales. In contrast, the business of a leading manufacturer usually represents a very small proportion of
business for each of the major multiples.
2My analysis goes precisely in this direction. The focus of the paper is twofold. First, I highlight
the role that wholesale arrangements play in softening competition in a dynamic framework where
retailers have the initiative ￿ i.e., dictate the wholesale trade rules. In a nutshell, ine¢ cient ver-
tical contracting emerges as a mechanism to implement collusion among retailers, building on the
natural ￿ complementarity￿between retail and wholesale prices. When collusion between retail-
ers is not sustainable with e¢ cient wholesale deals, this complementarity makes it advantageous
for retailers to rely on ine¢ cient input supply in order to squeeze the wedge between collusive
and deviation pro￿ts, whereby weakening the incentive to deviate from the implicit agreement.
In addition, (ine¢ cient) collusive outcomes must be supported by wholesale contracts featuring
negative franchise fees (i.e., payments made by manufacturers to retailers, such as listing fees and
slotting allowances) a practice which is widespread in many markets.
The second main purpose of the paper is to comment on the role played by communication
between competing supply chains on the set of collusive outcomes achievable in games where
the contractual power is in the retailers￿hands. Communication is, indeed, fundamental to
strengthen cartels￿sustainability, although generating some e¢ ciency losses. I study two simple
communication regimes: one where retailers share information about wholesale contracts (public
contracts), and the other where bilateral negotiations between downstream and upstream ￿rms
are secret (private contracts). I show that collusion possibilities considerably broaden under public
contracts and argue that the value of communication increases the less patient ￿rms are and the
larger the number of competing retailers is. This point seems particularly relevant because, as
documented by Briley et al. (1994), U.S. courts often hesitate to prohibit information exchanges
between competing supply chains when the bargaining power seems concentrated on the retailers￿
side, a view that is contrasted by my ￿ndings.2
I consider an industry where, in each period, N retailers sell a homogenous good and compete
by setting prices. The ￿nal good must be recovered from an intermediate input, which is supplied
by upstream ￿rms (suppliers) each being in an exclusive relationship with a single retailer. The
interaction is repeated over an in￿nite horizon and, in each period, retailers dictate the wholesale
trading rules (two-part tari⁄s) by making take-it or leave-it o⁄ers to suppliers. Therefore, in
contrast to the pioneering papers on the subject (Jullien and Rey, 2007, Nocke and White, 2007,
and Schinkel et al. 2008) dealing with collusion between upstream ￿rms, I focus on collusion
between retailers.
With public contracts, retailers observe the wholesale contracts o⁄ered by rivals before com-
peting in the downstream market. Hence, in this regime, it is possible to tailor retail price
2Briley et al. (1994) pg. 10 ￿ e.g., Belliston v. Texaco.
3decisions to the game contractual history. I show that, as long as wholesale contracts purpose-
fully specify ine¢ cient trading rules, retailers can make positive pro￿ts by charging prices higher
than marginal costs (wholesale prices in my model) even when the discount factor ￿ falls short of
the critical value (N ￿ 1)=N.3 While in the static game the unique symmetric equilibrium fea-
tures no double marginalization ￿ i.e., zero wholesale prices ￿ and null franchise fees, retailers
might prefer to pay positive wholesale prices for collusive purposes in the repeated game.
There is one main trade-o⁄ shaping the self-enforceability conditions needed to sustain collu-
sion in the downstream market with public contracts. On the one hand, excessively high wholesale
prices introduce double marginalization, which sti￿ es the di⁄erence between deviation and col-
lusive pro￿ts. To understand this e⁄ect remember that when retailers face zero (or very low)
marginal costs, by undercutting the monopoly price a deviant retailer grabs a spot gain close to
the monopoly pro￿t. This is no longer true when retailers are committed to pay large wholesale
prices, undercutting would then secure lower pro￿ts to the deviant. On the other hand, a too large
wholesale price ￿ i.e., low downstream margins ￿ can induce a retailer not only to undercut
rivals, but also to change its wholesale contract in such a way to gain a competitive advantage
over them and obtain a higher pro￿t from deviation: what I will de￿ne a ￿ public deviation￿ .
Building on the trade-o⁄between those two e⁄ects, I characterize the optimal collusion strat-
egy and show that the (e¢ cient) monopoly pro￿t is sustainable for large values of the discount
factor, in this parameter region downstream ￿rms charge the monopoly price, set a wholesale
price equal to zero and uniformly share ￿nal demand. For intermediate values of the discount
factor, the monopoly pro￿t is still sustainable, but only via ine¢ cient contracting, wholesale
prices need to be positive and franchise fees are negative to sustain full collusion. Below this
region, instead, collusion is still viable with ine¢ cient contracting, but retail prices fall short of
the monopoly level. Clearly, for very impatient ￿rms (￿ close to zero) the unique equilibrium is
perfect competition.
In the second part of the analysis I consider the case of private (unobservable) contracts. I
show that when retail pricing decisions cannot be contingent on the rivals￿contracts, preventing
retailers from grabbing spot deviation gains becomes impossible below the critical discount factor
(N ￿ 1)=N. The reason is that, with private contracts, ￿rms that are cheated cannot instanta-
neously react to deviations relying on a wholesale contract di⁄erent than that speci￿ed by the
(implicit) agreement. This insight has a simple, but novel testable implication concerning the link
between market concentration, ￿rms￿intertemporal preferences and the role of communication.
Public contracts help downstream collusion in very competitive environments (N large) or in
3Below this threshold collusion would not arise in the standard repeated Bertrand game, that is, in the game
where retailers do not need to rely on suppliers to produce the ￿nal good.
4circumstances where ￿rms￿discount factor is not too large (￿ small).
Summarizing, the paper o⁄ers two novel insights to the literature on dynamic competition
between competing supply chains. First, it emphasizes the coordination role that suppliers play
in dynamic games where retailers jointly gain by ￿xing downstream prices. The analysis ro-
bustly shows that there exists a mechanism which allows to sustain collusion even in the region
of parameters where self-enforceability would not be met in the standard (repeated) Bertrand
analysis.
Second, the paper provides a novel rationale for payments made by suppliers to retailers ￿
e.g., slotting allowances ￿ as well as for excessively high wholesale prices (double marginaliza-
tion). While earlier models have discussed di⁄erent reasons for double marginalization to be
welfare detrimental, less research has been done on negative franchise fees: a contractual prac-
tice that, as a matter of fact, can be spot quite easily by antitrust authorities. This practice
is common in many markets: according to the US Federal Trade Commission, since 1998 man-
ufacturers￿expenses in slotting allowances have increased sharply from a share of 28% of their
total expenses in promotional activities up to 50%. Ever since this practice began, state and fed-
eral agencies conducted numerous investigations, but none have resulted in a conclusion against
slotting allowances. On February 2001, the Federal Trade Commission released a sta⁄ report
addressing slotting allowances and other related practices in the supermarket industry. The re-
port notes that such arrangements have the potential to lead to the exclusion of rival suppliers
or to anti-competitive horizontal collusion among groups of suppliers or retailers.4 According to
a former FCT Chairman (Robert Pitofsky) there is still little theoretical work on the topic to
issue guidelines on slotting allowances; this line was rea¢ rmed by the FTC sta⁄ in 2002, when
it was claimed that more studies need to be conducted to learn more about this practice before
intervening. My paper contributes to this important debate. While the existing literature has
mainly focused on suppliers￿incentive to use this instrument, the evidence corroborates the view
that negative franchise fees are positively correlated with the exercise of buyer power.5 In this
respect, my model is the ￿rst to emphasize that, in repeated games, negative fees can be used
for collusive purposes. Moreover, while in the U.S. courts generally regard positive (and high)
franchise fees as a signal of price ￿xing ￿ see, e.g., Briley et al. (1994) ￿ I show that this is not
necessarily true when the contracting power is on the retailers￿side.
Finally, results are robust to several extensions regarding voluntary information sharing among
downstream ￿rms, more general contracts and alternative punishment schemes. The rest of the
4Report on the Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Slotting Allowances and Other Marketing Practices
in the Grocery Industry, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/02/slotting.htm.
5See Rey et al. (2008) for a detailed discussion on this point.
5paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 below links my contribution to the existing
literature. I introduce the model in Section 3. Section 4 characterizes optimal collusion with
public contracts. The case of private contracts is analyzed in Section 5. I study the value of public
contracting in Section 6. Section 7 discusses some robustness issues and Section 8 concludes. All
proves are provided in the Appendix.
2 Related literature
My analysis shares common features with the existing vertical contracting literature.
Given its dynamic perspective, it is related to papers studying the repeated interaction between
upstream and downstream ￿rms ￿ e.g., Jullien and Rey (2007), Nocke and White (2007) and
Schinkel et al. (2008). There is one key di⁄erence between these papers and mine: while I
am interested in downstream collusion, they all study the opposite case of upstream collusion.
Moreover, while in Nocke and White (2007) vertical mergers have detrimental welfare e⁄ects by
broadening collusion possibilities, in my model the opposite obtains: delegation of input supply
is what makes collusion possible via ine¢ cient contracting. Jullien and Rey (2007) identify the
negative e⁄ects of RPM, a practice often seen as e¢ ciency enhancing in static models of complete
information (the Chicago school argument), my model concludes that collusion can be sustained
by way of contracting rules that are ine¢ cient in the static game. Finally, while Schinkel et al.
(2008) show that upstream collusion requires low wholesale prices when the bargaining power is
in the suppliers￿hands, I ￿nd the opposite prediction with buyer power.
My analysis also overlaps with the literature on ￿ buyer power￿ . Sha⁄er (1991) analyzes a
static duopoly model with di⁄erentiated products and buyer power where slotting allowances
and resale price maintenance (RPM) are substitutes. He shows that the equilibrium features
slotting allowances with public contracts. This outcome cannot occur in my stage game because of
Bertrand competition, therefore my focus on the repeated game. Marx and Sha⁄er (2008) consider
a (static) model with buyer power where strong retailers can exclude competitors by o⁄ering
￿ three-part tari⁄s￿that include slotting allowances. In contrast to their model, where negative
fees are a way of creating negative externalities (exclusionary purposes) between downstream
￿rms, in my framework these instruments create positive externalities and are used as a tool to
sustain cooperative behavior. Finally, Rey et al. (2008), analyze the competitive e⁄ects of up-front
payments in a contracting situation where rival retailers o⁄er contracts to a single manufacturer.
In contrast to Bernheim and Whinston (1986, 1998), they show that two-part tari⁄s do not su¢ ce
to implement the monopoly outcome in a static game, and argue that more complex arrangements,
6which combine slotting allowances and standard two-part tari⁄s, are necessary to internalize all
the contractual externalities stemming from common agency.6 My model departs from Rey et al.
(2008) in two main respects. On one hand, I study a dynamic framework while they focus on a
static game, so my paper is a complement to them.7 On the other, while I purposefully abstract
from common agency issues, their results mainly rely on the externalities that these games feature
and do not hold in a model with downstream Bertrand competition, which is instead the building
block of my analysis.8
3 The model
Players. Consider N ￿ 2 independent and identical downstream ￿rms (retailers), each denoted
by Ri (i = 1;::;N), selling a homogenous good and competing by setting prices. The demand for
the ￿nal good is D(p); so that, given a vector of retail prices p =(pi)N
i=1, each downstream ￿rm i
faces the individual demand
Di (p) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 if pi > pj for some j 6= i;
D(pi) if pi < minj6=i pj;
D(p)
#fj:pj=minfp1;:::;pNgg if pi = minfp1;:::;pNg:
(1)
Retailers￿production technologies are linear and marginal costs are normalized to zero. Nev-
ertheless, the ￿nal output must be recovered from an intermediate input that is produced by
upstream ￿rms (suppliers). Following the literature9, I assume that suppliers, each denoted by
Si (i = 1;::;N), are in exclusive relationships with retailers.10 The intermediate input is trans-
formed into the ￿nal output according to a one-to-one technology and, for simplicity, upstream
production technologies are linear, with zero marginal costs.
6The same point has been recently made by Semenov and Wright (2009) in a model where suppliers have full
bargaining power.
7This is consistent with the legal approach taken in Carstensen (2000 and 2004) who argues that antitrust
treatment of buyer power should be sensitive to the di⁄erences in the economic incentives to collude or unilaterally
exercise monopsony power between buyers and sellers.
8My analysis extends to product di⁄erentiation, see, e.g., Sha⁄er (1991).
9For instance Jullien and Rey (2007) and Schinkel et al. (2008).
10In an earlier version of the paper I show that results do not change whenever the number of suppliers is larger
than N and retailers have full bargaining power. The opposite case where the number of suppliers is lower than
that of retailers would not present di⁄erences with the analysis performed in the current paper if exclusivity can
be enforced. Were this not possible, the analysis would be more involved because of common agency problems
(see, e.g., Rey et al. 2008). To simplify the analysis I rule out this possibility.
7Wholesale contracts. Retailers have full bargaining power in dictating the wholesale trading
rules and make take-it or leave-it o⁄ers to suppliers, whose reservation utility is normalized to
zero. A wholesale contract between Ri and Si is a two-part tari⁄, Ci ￿ (Ti;wi), specifying
a wholesale price wi for each unit of intermediate input ordered by Ri and a franchise fee Ti.
Franchise fees are paid up-front and are thus sunk when downstream ￿rms set retail prices. Once
￿nal demand materializes, Ri buys inputs from Si and pays the negotiated unit price wi. I will
discuss in a concluding section more general contracts.
Information. Two di⁄erent regimes concerning contracts￿observability are considered:
￿ Public contracts. The contract signed between Ri and Si is observed by all other players
before downstream price competition takes place.11
￿ Private contracts. Wholesale contracts are secret ￿ i.e., a retailer-supplier pair cannot
observe the contracts signed by its opponents.
With observable contracts downstream ￿rms can condition retail prices on competitors￿whole-
sale o⁄ers. This is not possible with unobservable contracts. For most of the paper these two
regimes will be treated as exogenous features of the environment, I will discuss in an extension
the case of voluntary communication.
The existing literature often assumes that wholesale contracts, or some of their dimensions,
are public (Jullien and Rey, 2007, Nocke and White, 2007, and Rey and Stiglitz, 1995, among
many others). According to Briley et al. (1994) there exists substantial evidence showing that
information sharing agreements about wholesale contracts are widespread in several U.S. retail
industries. For instance, this seems to be the established praxis in business format franchising
where the mandatory disclosure of franchising contracts required by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion since 1979 allows ￿rms to have almost free access to their rivals￿past contracts.12
In practice, communication among competing ￿rms is facilitated by information sharing agree-
ments ￿ i.e., strategic alliances and (retail) trade associations. Moreover, an important trend
in product distribution is the growth of information-intensive channels. These are usually char-
acterized by channel partners who invest in bundles of sophisticated information technology like
telecommunication and satellite linkages, bar coding and electronic scanning systems, database
11Nothing would change if this information can be observed only by retailers and not by suppliers.
12Entrepreneur￿ s Magazine collects yearly data about franchise fees that are published in the Franchise 500
survey. As Lofantaine and Shaw (1999) report, these fees are very stable over time ￿ i.e., around 75% of
franchisors never changed their royalty rate or franchise fee over a 13-year time period.
8management systems etc., to not only disseminate information within a given organization, but
also among competitors ￿ see, e.g., Stern et al. (1996).13
Timing. I consider an in￿nitely repeated game with discrete time, ￿ = 0;::;+1. The sequence
of events within the stage game, thereafter G, unfolds as follows:
(T=1) Contracting. Retailers simultaneously o⁄er contracts to suppliers.
(T=2) Acceptance. Suppliers simultaneously accept or refuse the received o⁄ers. If a contract
is ￿nalized, the franchise fee is paid.
(T=3) Retail competition. Contractual rules become public information across all players
depending on the observability regime ￿ i.e., public vs private contracts. Downstream ￿rms set
retail prices and the market clears: ￿nal demands materialize and input orders are placed.
Each downstream ￿rm has an in￿nite life-time horizon and its objective is to maximize the
discounted sum of pro￿ts. The common discount factor is ￿ 2 [0;1]. Following the approach taken
Jullien and Rey (2007), I assume that suppliers live only for one period (alternatively, retailers
can only commit to spot distribution contracts). All parties are risk neutral and have a zero
reservation utility level.
Histories. With observable contracts, all players observe the same public history h￿ at the
end of the contracting stage ￿ (before retailers compete in stage ￿): h￿ ￿ (p￿;C￿) and contains












t=0) o⁄ered by each
retailer up to ￿. Hence, in this regime, the game is one of perfect monitoring: all past actions
become common knowledge at the end of each play. With private contracts, instead, at stage
￿ downstream ￿rm i only observes past retail prices but not contractual histories ￿ i.e., Ri￿ s
information set h￿
i ￿ (p￿;C￿
i) still contains past retail price decisions (p￿) but only its own
contractual history (C￿
i).
Collusion. I look for symmetric and stationary pure strategy equilibria such that retailers seek
to collude whenever possible. The optimal implicit agreement between them (cartel) maximizes
13As noted by Niraj and Narasimhan (2004), major retailers such as Sainsbury and Marks & Spencers in U.K. as
well as A&P grocery stores, Super Valu Stores and Von￿ s supermarket in U.S. have made substantial investments in
these technologies. Similarly, leading manufacturers such as Procter and Gamble have responded to the availability
of greater information by developing tracking and information systems at the retail store level.
9(downstream) industry pro￿ts subject to the relevant self-enforceability constraints and the sup-
pliers￿participation constraints. A collusive symmetric and stationary strategy, thereafter ^ ￿,
requires all downstream ￿rms to o⁄er the contract Cc ￿ (T c;wc) and set the retail price pc in
the collusive phase, and to o⁄er the contract Cp ￿ (T p;wp) and charge a retail price pp in the
punishment phase.
I focus on punishment codes requiring in￿nite Nash reversion ￿ i.e., following a deviation
by one retailer, rivals will o⁄er the competitive and e¢ cient contract C￿ ￿ (0;0) and price at
marginal costs for the rest of the game. The main di⁄erence between public and private contracts
concerning punishments will be discussed in Sections 4 and 5.
Equilibrium concept. The equilibrium concept is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)
for the regime of public contracts, and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) with the added ￿ pas-
sive beliefs￿re￿nement14 for that with private contracts. I will be more precise on the additional
re￿nements needed to pin down equilibria of the games studied throughout the analysis in Sections
4 and 5.
Simplifying assumptions. The analysis will be developed under the following standard as-
sumptions:
A1 The demand function D(p) is strictly decreasing and twice continuously di⁄erentiable. It
satis￿es standard Inada conditions: (i) D(0) > 0, and (ii) there exists an upper-bound (p)
on the retail price such that D(p) > 0 for all p < p and D(p) = 0 for all p ￿ p.
Let ￿(p) ￿ D(p)p,
A2 The function ￿(:) is single peaked: it features a unique internal maximum pm identi￿ed by






A3 Whenever indi⁄erent between accepting a wholesale contract and remain inactive, suppliers
prefer to secure input supply.
This hypothesis simply allows to restrict attention to the class of equilibria with positive sales.
14Given an equilibrium candidate of the game with private contracts, if a suppliers is o⁄ered an unexpected
contract, it believes that all other suppliers are o⁄ered the equilibrium contract.
104 Public contracts
In this section I provide the equilibrium characterization with observable contracts. I ￿rst analyze
the static game and then move to the repeated game.
4.1 The stage game
Characterizing the equilibrium of the stage-game is the ￿rst necessary step to approach the case of
repeated interaction. With public contracts, G is a two-stage game. In the ￿rst stage downstream
￿rms simultaneously choose wholesale contracts; then, given these o⁄ers, they set retail prices
in the second stage. Since retailers are ex ante identical, I focus on symmetric pure strategy
equilibria where they all o⁄er the wholesale contract Ce ￿ (we;T e), charge the ￿nal price pe and
sell the same positive amount of ￿nal good D(pe)=N.
Before stating the main result of the section few preliminary but important remarks are
worthwhile. First, since franchise fees are paid up-front once wholesale deals are ￿nalized, they






Di (pi;p￿i)(pi ￿ wi):
Second, given a symmetric equilibrium candidate (Ce;pe), ￿ o⁄-equilibrium￿histories ￿ i.e., those
situations where one or more unexpected o⁄ers are observed ￿ might lead to multiple Nash
equilibria in the corresponding downstream subgame, exactly as in the standard Bertrand model
with asymmetric costs. A re￿nement criterion must then be chosen in order to pin down an equi-
librium. To this purpose, I posit that in every subgame featuring multiple equilibria, downstream
￿rms coordinate on that satisfying weak Pareto-dominance. Formally,
De￿nition 1 (Weak Pareto-dominance) Consider a contractual history C such that Cj = Ce for
all j 6= i and Ci 6= Ce, with wi < we. Let pe (C) 2 <N and ^ pe (C) 2 <N be the price vectors




j (C) ￿ wj) = Dj (^ p
e (C))(^ p
e
j (C) ￿ wj) = 0 8 j = 1;:::;N; j 6= i: (2)




i (C) ￿ wi) > Di (^ p
e (C))(^ p
e
i (C) ￿ wi): (3)
Essentially, given the multiplicity of Pareto-rankable equilibria in each subgame where one
11retailer is more e¢ cient than its rivals, there exists a non-trivial coordination problem between
the downstream ￿rms, and consequently a selection issue. The weak Pareto-dominance criterion
selects the price vector as the weakly payo⁄-dominant equilibrium.15 Accordingly, the equilibrium
concept that I will use to solve the retail subgame is as follows:
De￿nition 2 (Retail stage solution concept) Given the pro￿le of contracts C = (Ci)N
i=1, the vector
of prices pe (C) = (pe
i (C))
N
i=1 is a Nash equilibrium satisfying weak Pareto-dominance if and only
if:
(i) Each price pe
i (C) is a best reply to pe
￿i (C) ￿ i.e.,
p
e








(pi ￿ wi) 8 i = 1;::;N: (4)
(ii) For any contractual history C such that Cj ￿ (w;T) for all j 6= i; while Ci 6= C with
wi < w, and all vectors of prices ^ pe (C) 6= pe (C) that satisfy (2) and (4), equation (3)
must also hold.
Essentially, given a contractual history C, the equilibrium prices chosen in the corresponding
downstream subgame must: (i) form a Nash equilibrium ￿ i.e., satisfy the standard best reply
criterion; and (ii) ful￿ll the additional weak Pareto-dominance re￿nement (whenever this criterion
can be applied). I will argue that a symmetric equilibrium satisfying these requirements always
exists in my model.
Equipped with this characterization, I can now introduce the solution concept for game G.
De￿nition 3 (Two-stage game solution concept) A symmetric SPNE of G, with the added re-
￿nement of weak Pareto-dominance in the downstream game, features a wholesale contract Ce
and a retail price pe such that:









e) ￿ wi) ￿ Ti : Di (~ p
e (C
e;Ci))wi + Ti ￿ 0g; (1)
15Alternatively, instead of weak Pareto-dominance one could use a re￿nement based on a modi￿ed notion of
weakly dominated strategies. Essentially, one could assume that among the possible (asymmetric) Nash equilibria
of the downstream subgame, the retailers that are not supposed to sell, because they are less e¢ cient than rivals,
never charge a price lower than their marginal costs. Arguably, this behavior allows to avoid losses in case the
most e¢ cient retailers, that are expected to sell in equilibrium, mistakenly charge a too high price so that those
who were expected not to sell actually face a positive demand and make negative pro￿ts because selling at a price




e = 0; (2)
where ~ pe (Ce;Ci) ￿ (pe (Ce;Ci);pe
i (Ci;Ce)), with pj = pe (Ce;Ci) for all j 6= i, is the price
vector chosen in the selected Nash equilibrium of the subgame corresponding to the history
where Cj = Ce for all j 6= i and Ci 6= Ce. While pe = pe
i (Ce) is the retail price obtained in
the symmetric equilibrium.
(ii) If the subgame corresponding to the contractual history such that Cj = Ce for all j 6=
i and Ci 6= Ce, with wi < w, features multiple Nash equilibria, retailers coordinate on
the equilibrium ~ pe (Ce;Ci) that satis￿es De￿nition 2 part (ii) and where the most e¢ cient
retailer serves the whole market.
Condition (1) simply states that the equilibrium wholesale contract must satisfy the best
response criterion given the equilibrium of the subgame triggered by any unilateral ￿ contract￿
deviation. Condition (2), instead, is the suppliers￿participation constraints, which must bind
in equilibrium since retailers have full bargaining power. As already noted before, to pin down
reasonable equilibria of the two stage game G, I restrict attention to equilibria satisfying De￿nition
2. The main proposition of the section can be then stated.
Proposition 1 Assume A1-A3. Then game G features a unique SPNE satisfying the added weak
Pareto-dominance re￿nement. In this equilibrium all players make zero pro￿ts, retailers o⁄er the
competitive and e¢ cient contract (Ce = C￿) and set retail prices equal to marginal costs (pe = 0).
The intuition for this result is straightforward. First, because retailers are in Bertrand com-
petition, they must make zero pro￿ts in a symmetric equilibrium of the one-shot game. Second,
since contracts with positive wholesale prices limit retailers￿ability to undercut one another, the
unique equilibrium of the game must feature e¢ cient wholesale contracts ￿ i.e., w￿ = T ￿ = 0.
As a ￿nal remark, note that the analysis is developed under the hypothesis of Bertrand
competition for a speci￿c purpose. In contrast to static models analyzing Cournot or di⁄erentiated
Bertrand competition16, in my framework the static game has a unique perfectly competitive
equilibrium where, even with public contracts, retailers price at marginal costs and wholesale
prices are set to zero. This shows that the strategic value of public contracts cannot always be
rationalized in static models, whereby motivating the dynamic analysis which is at the core of
the next section.
16See, e.g., Sha⁄er (1991).
134.2 Repeated interaction
Consider now the in￿nitely repeated game. In the following I will identify the conditions under
which downstream collusion is sustainable, and then characterize the properties of the implicit
agreement that supports such cooperative outcome. As before, also in this case I will focus on
symmetric equilibria where in the collusive phase all retailers o⁄er the contract Cc, charge the
retail price pc and evenly share ￿nal demand.
To gain insights about the key forces shaping the equilibrium of the repeated game note that,
with public contracts, there are two types of deviations that a retailer may envision. First, it may
stick to the collusive contractual rule Cc and cheat its rivals only by undercutting the collusive
price pc: a secret (or unobservable) deviation. Second, a retailer may ￿ announce￿its forthcoming
deviation to rivals by (publicly) o⁄ering a wholesale contract di⁄erent than Cc, and then charge
the retail price in accordance with the Nash equilibrium that is expected to be played in the
following subgame: a public (or observable) deviation.
Of course, these two di⁄erent types of deviations can be punished in di⁄erent manners. While
secret deviations are observed after demand has materialized, and so they can be punished only
from the next period onwards, a public deviation is instantaneously spot, and it therefore triggers
a reaction already in the very same period where it occurred. For the sake of crispiness, and
consistently with the equilibrium re￿nement stated in De￿nition 2, for the moment I assume that
retailers never coordinate on equilibria of the downstream (pricing) game that do not satisfy weak
Pareto-dominance:
A4 In any contractual history where the downstream game features multiple Nash equilibria,
retailers coordinate on those satisfying weak Pareto-dominance whenever this criterion can
be applied.
Arguably, this re￿nement also rules out asymmetric equilibria of the retail game where least
e¢ cient downstream ￿rms charge a price so low that they would make losses were the most e¢ cient
competitors mistakenly charging a too high price. Even if reasonable under some circumstances,
this hypothesis clearly rules out minmaxing behavior within stages where a public deviation
occurs. In Section 7, I argue that results are even stronger if retailers can play equilibrium
strategies that do not satisfy weak Pareto-dominance when punishing a public deviation, and show
that harsher punishments lead to results with the same qualitative features of those characterized
below.17 It is important to note, however, that a minmaxing behavior occurs following a secret
deviation. This is because when retailers spot a secret price cut, they will revert for the rest of
17I thank two insightful referees for bringing this point to my attention.
14the game to the unique equilibrium of the stage game that leads each player to get the lowest
possible payo⁄.
Before turning to the cartel￿ s optimization program it is important to note that, if at each
stage of the game downstream ￿rms symmetrically o⁄er the competitive and e¢ cient contract
C￿, the unique equilibrium features collusion supported by Nash reversion trigger strategies if
and only if the discount factor ￿ is larger than the standard threshold (N ￿ 1)=N.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the equilibrium outcome path has the competitive and e¢ cient contract
C￿ o⁄ered in each period. Then every retail price level between monopoly (pm) and perfect com-
petition (0) can be supported by Nash reversion trigger strategies if and only if ￿ ￿ (N ￿ 1)=N.
Otherwise, for ￿ < (N ￿ 1)=N, there exists a unique SPNE featuring perfect (e¢ cient) competi-
tion ￿ i.e., retail and wholesale prices are both equal to zero.
This lemma restates in a slightly more complex environment the textbook version of Folk
Theorem for the Bertrand game with perfect monitoring. It will be helpful to understand the
insights provided for the more interesting case where wholesale contracts can be distorted for
collusive purposes. I shall argue that equilibrium outcomes featuring positive retail prices can
emerge also in the region of parameters where the standard version of the Folk Theorem does not
hold ￿ i.e., for ￿ < (N ￿ 1)=N.
To understand more clearly the trade-o⁄ that makes this new collusion opportunities viable,
it is worthwhile discussing in detail the incentive constraints that an implicit agreement between
downstream ￿rms must satisfy. To this purpose, let me ￿rst introduce some useful notation.
Given a public history h￿, denote by s(h￿) 2 f0;1g the dichotomous state variable taking value 1
if at the end of stage ￿ ￿1 the game is in a cooperative phase ￿ i.e., all retailers have obeyed to
the implicit agreement up to ￿ ￿1 ￿ and 0 if a deviation occurred. Moreover, within the subset
of histories such that no deviation occurred up to the end of period ￿ ￿1 ￿ i.e., those for which
the state variable s(h￿) takes value 1 ￿ denote by z (h￿) 2 f0;1g the dichotomous state variable
taking value 0 if within period ￿ a public deviation occurs, and 1 otherwise. A stationary and
symmetric collusion strategy ^ ￿ ￿ (^ ￿
￿ (h￿))
+1
￿=0 enforcing the non-competitive retail price pc and
the wholesale contract Cc on the cooperative phase can be thus formally described as follows,
De￿nition 4 Under A4, the optimal collusive strategy ^ ￿ requires each retailer i:
(i) To o⁄er Cc and charge pc if s(h￿) = 1 and z (h￿) = 1;
(ii) To o⁄er C￿ and charge a retail price equal to 0 from ￿ onwards if s(h￿) = 0;
15(iii) To charge the retail price pe (Cc;Cj) = wc if s(h￿) = 1, z (h￿) = 0 and Cj 6= Cc with
min
j2fj:Cj6=Ccg
wj < wc, or if wj > wc for all rivals but one (say i0) who o⁄ers Ci0 = Cc.






with " > 0 and small enough if s(h￿) = 1, z (h￿) = 0 and Cj 6= Cc; with wj > wc for all
j 6= i.
Where, as noted in Section 4.1, pe (Cc;Cj) is the Nash equilibrium retail price satisfying weak
Pareto-dominance charged by each retailer i 6= j when one or more unexpected o⁄ers occur.
Essentially, the collusive strategy ^ ￿ prescribes: (i) to keep cooperating as long as no one has
deviated; (ii) to o⁄er the competitive and e¢ cient contract C￿ for the rest of the game as long as
a deviation has occurred before stage ￿; and (iii) to charge the Nash equilibrium price satisfying
weak Pareto-dominance (i.e., pe (Cc;Cj)) if up to stage ￿ ￿1 the game was in a cooperative phase,
but at least one retailer j has o⁄ered an unexpected contract in stage ￿.
For ^ ￿ to be self-enforceable, all players must ￿nd it convenient to follow its rules ￿ i.e.,
downstream and upstream ￿rms must not have pro￿table deviations. First, suppliers must make







c ￿ 0: (3)
This constraint simply implies that, in the collusive phase, the sum of the franchise fees and
each supplier￿ s sales revenue is non-negative.
In contrast, two types of deviations must be considered for downstream ￿rms. Each retailer
must not ￿nd it worthwhile to o⁄er the collusive wholesale contract Cc, and then undercut pc
(secret deviation). Given the strategy ^ ￿, this type of behavior cannot be pro￿table as long as
the intertemporal gain from collusion exceeds the spot gain that a retailer can grab by secretly











Moreover, retailers must also not ￿nd it convenient to deviate ￿ publicly￿￿ i.e., they must not
gain by o⁄ering both a contract and a retail price di⁄erent than those speci￿ed by ^ ￿. Given the
punishment code described in De￿nition 4, this type of deviation is not pro￿table as long as the
16following self-enforceability constraint is met:
V
c ￿ max





e) ￿ wi) ￿ Ti : Di (~ p
e (C
e;Ci))wi + Ti ￿ 0g; (5)
where ~ pe (Ce;Ci) = (pe (Ce;Ci);pe
i (Ci;Ce)) is the Nash equilibrium vector of prices satisfying
A4 ￿ i.e., weak Pareto-dominance if this criterion can be applied ￿ played in the subgame that
is triggered by the deviation Ci 6= Ce. This leads to the following result:
Lemma 2 Under A4, the maximal pro￿t that a retailer can make via a public deviation is




The intertemporal pro￿t that each retailer earns on the cooperative path must exceed the
pro￿t that it would make by cutting the price down to wc ￿ ", with " small enough ￿ i.e.,
slightly below the punishment price charged by its competitors when spotting a public deviation.
This is because in every ￿ o⁄-equilibrium￿subgame that is triggered by a public deviation, the
minimal price that cheated ￿rms can charge and that is consistent with Nash equilibria and weak
Pareto-dominance is their marginal cost.
Next de￿nition formally introduces the notion of an optimal symmetric collusive strategy with
public contracts.
De￿nition 5 With public contracts, an optimal symmetric and stationary collusive strategy ^ ￿
maximizes retailers￿ joint pro￿ts subject to the self-enforceability and participation constraints






(p;C)2<3D(p)(p ￿ w) ￿ NT;
s.t. (3), (4) and (6).
The best symmetric and stationary collusive strategy has to maximize the (downstream)
industry pro￿ts provided that no player can pro￿tably deviate. The cartel￿ s payo⁄ is de￿ned as
total industry pro￿ts D(p)(p ￿ w) net of the aggregate franchise fees NT.
Obviously, in the region of parameters where positive pro￿ts cannot be sustained, the optimal
collusive strategy must require retail prices equal to marginal costs (perfect competition) and
e¢ cient wholesale contracting. Next lemma shows that whenever retailers o⁄er the e¢ cient
contract on the equilibrium path and collude, then ^ ￿ supports the monopoly pro￿t ￿ i.e., each
downstream ￿rm gets ￿C
i = ￿(pm)=N:
17Lemma 3 As long as ^ ￿ requires retailers to o⁄er the e¢ cient and competitive contract C￿ and
to charge positive retail prices in the cooperative phase, the monopoly price pm can be sustained
in equilibrium (full collusion).
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Recall that when all retailers o⁄er the com-
petitive and e¢ cient contract C￿ in the cooperative phase, the self-enforceability constraints (4)
and (6) rewrite as:
￿(pc)
N (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ maxf0;￿(p
c)g:
Hence, with e¢ cient contracts, downstream ￿rms can share the monopoly pro￿ts only if col-
lusion is viable in the simple repeated Bertrand analysis where retailers own the upstream tech-
nology and can produce the intermediate input at no cost ￿ e.g., they are vertically integrated.
As already discussed above, this result can hold only if ￿ exceeds the threshold (N ￿ 1)=N.
When retailers are not su¢ ciently patient to sustain monopoly pro￿ts via the e¢ cient con-
tract, the analysis becomes much more complex. A natural question is then whether there exists
a symmetric collusive strategy, still securing positive pro￿ts to downstream ￿rms, which is sup-
ported by positive wholesale prices and negative franchise fees. Clearly, the answer depends on
the interplay between the incentive constraints (4) and (6). Since the suppliers￿participation
constraint must bind in the optimum, substituting T c = ￿(1=N)D(pc)wc into both equations
leads to the following more intuitive and compact formula for incentive compatibility:
￿(pc)















There is one fundamental trade-o⁄ shaping this self-enforceability condition. Clearly, increasing
the wholesale price makes public deviations more pro￿table ￿ i.e., ￿(wc) is increasing in wc for
all wc ￿ pm. This is because a high wholesale price ￿ i.e., low downstream margin ￿ makes
public deviations more attractive: the within-period punishment is less severe the higher the
collusive downstream margin is. However, a low wholesale price ￿ i.e., high downstream margin
￿ makes secret deviations more attractive. This is because undercutting the collusive price yields
a larger pro￿t when retailers face zero (or very low) marginal costs than when they are committed
to pay large wholesale prices for the intermediate input.
Hence, given a collusive retail price pc > 0, the relevant question is whether changes in wc


















18Next lemma summarizes the trade-o⁄ just discussed by characterizing the shape of   (:); it
shows that a necessary condition for ^ ￿ to enforce collusion in the range ￿ < (N ￿ 1)=N requires
a positive wholesale price wc > 0.
Lemma 4 Assume A1-A4. Then the following properties hold:













for wc ￿ wc (pc);
￿(wc) for wc 2 (wc (pc);pm]:
(ii) If the equilibrium features collusion for values of ￿ below the threshold (N￿1)=N, the contract
Cc must require positive wholesale prices (wc > 0) and negative franchise fees (T c < 0).
As explained above, for small values of the collusive wholesale price (wc) retailers￿best de-
viation involves only a secret price cut, while for large values of wc public deviations are more
pro￿table. For a given pc, there exists a unique value of wc at which cheating retailers are
indi⁄erent between one or the other type of deviation.
Building on this simple and intuitive result, the next theorem identi￿es the conditions that
the optimal implicit collusive agreement between downstream ￿rms must satisfy. Its objective is
to identify a range of discount factors lying below the critical value (N ￿ 1)=N where a collusive
outcome can still emerge in equilibrium.
Theorem 2 Assume A1-A4. Then, the optimal collusive strategy satis￿es the following proper-
ties:
(i) For ￿ ￿ (N ￿ 1)=N full collusion is compatible with the e¢ cient contract. Retailers share
uniformly the monopoly pro￿t ￿m = ￿(pm) and o⁄er the e¢ cient contract C￿.
(ii) There exists a lower bound ￿
1 (N) < (N ￿ 1)=N, such that for ￿ 2 [￿
1 (N);(N ￿ 1)=N) full
collusion is still viable. In this region of parameters retailers share uniformly the monopoly









with corresponding franchise fee T m = ￿(1=N)D(pm)wm.
19(iii) There exists a threshold ￿
0 (N) < ￿
1 (N) such that for all ￿ 2 [￿
0 (N);￿
1 (N)) collusion is
still viable but ine¢ cient. In this range the collusive retail price (p) and the wholesale price



















with corresponding franchise fee T = ￿(1=N)D(p)w.
(iv) The bound ￿
1 (N) is
￿




Moreover, let p(￿;N) be the solution of (9) and (10), the bound ￿
0 (N) is identi￿ed by the
zero retail price condition p(￿;N) = 0.
The intuition for this result is simple and it builds on the results stated before. If retailers are
patient enough collusion is e¢ cient exactly as in the in￿nitely repeated Bertrand game where each
retailer is integrated with its own supplier. However, while in a model without suppliers, retailers￿
temptation to undercut each other would be so high for ￿ < (N ￿ 1)=N to frustrate any attempt
of cooperation, with vertical relationships this is not always true. A careful design of wholesale
contracts can still make cooperation viable in this region of parameters. The implicit cost of
collusion, though, is double marginalization: even if contracts are such that suppliers break-even,
positive wholesale prices and negative franchise fees are needed to squeeze the wedge between
collusive and deviation pro￿ts. Clearly, for discount factors close to zero collusion becomes not
sustainable at all ￿ i.e., for ￿ < ￿
0 (N).
Summing up, the optimal collusive strategy speci￿es a retail price pc and a wholesale price wc




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 for ￿ < ￿
0 (N)
p for ￿ 2 [￿
0 (N);￿
1 (N))





> > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > :
0 for ￿ < ￿
0 (N)
w for ￿ 2 [￿
0 (N);￿
1 (N))
wm for ￿ 2 (￿
1 (N);(N ￿ 1)=N)
0 for ￿ ￿ (N ￿ 1)=N
:
20Clearly, besides the aforementioned static work on buyer power, there might be other stories
that could square ine¢ cient wholesale deals and public contracting ￿ see, e.g., the large body of
work on double marginalization, Motta (2000, Ch. 6). But, in this literature, where the initiative
is on the suppliers￿hands, franchise fees are typically positive and have bene￿cial welfare e⁄ects
insofar as they prevent double marginalization. My analysis, instead, unambiguously suggests
that antitrust and competition policy authorities should regard as anticompetitive per se forms
of communication between retailers, which make it possible to share information about wholesale
contracts and are bundled with negative franchise fees.
Comparative statics. To understand how ￿rms￿intertemporal preferences and the degree of
concentration in the downstream market a⁄ect retailers￿market power, it is interesting to study
the equilibrium mark-up (downstream margin), mc = (pc ￿ wc)=pc and show how it changes with
respect to the underlying parameters of the model (￿ and N).
With full and e¢ cient collusion the mark-up is mainly shaped by the characteristics of demand
through the ￿rst-order condition in A2. By contrast, when collusion is supported by ine¢ cient
contracts the mark-up also depends on the characteristics of supply through the self-enforceability
constraints. This leads to the following result:
Proposition 3 Assume A1-A4. The mark-up mc satis￿es the following properties:
(i) It is weakly increasing in ￿;
(ii) For ￿ < ￿
1 (N) it is decreasing in N, while the opposite obtains for ￿ ￿ ￿
1 (N):
Industries with more patient ￿rms feature higher price-cost margins. As ￿ increases, retailers
become more patient and value less spot deviation gains. Hence, there is less need to distort
upward wholesale prices to sustain positive downstream margins. By the same token, when the
stakes of collusion are shared by fewer downstream ￿rms, a higher margin can be sustained as long
as collusion is ine¢ cient (pc < pm). Di⁄erently, in the region of parameters where full collusion
is sustainable through ine¢ cient contracting, the opposite relationship between the mark-up and
N obtains. In this region of parameters a larger number of downstream competitors reduces
the gain from a secret deviation, and hence it induces a lower distortion in the wholesale price
required to sustain monopoly pro￿ts. In other words, when the number of competitors increases,
each retailer will ￿nd it less convenient to deviate secretly because its production costs ￿ i.e.,
wmD(pm) ￿ will be too large relative to what he would pay in equilibrium ￿ i.e., wmD(pm)=N.
The linear example. I now construct a simple example putting Theorem 2 at work. Consider













5N2 ￿ 6N + 1;
one can check that wm is decreasing in N and that wm 2 (0;1=2). This expression together with
(11) yields
￿
1 (N) = 1 ￿
1=4
N (1 ￿ wm (N))wm (N)
;
where simple algebraic manipulations allow to verify that ￿
1 (N) 2 (0;(N ￿ 1)=N) and that
￿
1 (N) is increasing in N.
Consider now the region of parameters where collusion is ine¢ cient, ￿ < ￿
1 (N). Solving the
system of equations (9)-(10) we have:
p(￿;N) =
(N ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)(N2 (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 2N + 1)





(N (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1)(N2 (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 2N + 1)
3N + ￿ ￿ 2N￿ ￿ 3N2 + N3 + 3N2￿ ￿ 2N3￿ + N3￿
2 ￿ 1
;
which, as one can check with simple algebra, imply 0 ￿ w(:) ￿ p(:) for ￿ < (N ￿ 1)=N and








Moreover, it is easy to check that ￿
0 (N) is increasing in N, that ￿￿ (N) = ￿
1 (N)￿￿
0 (N) ￿ 0
and ￿￿ (N) is inverted-U shaped with respect to N with limN!+1 ￿￿ (N) = 0.
In the standard duopoly model (N = 2), for discount factors above the critical value 1=2
full collusion is sustainable with the e¢ cient contract. It is easy to check that wm = 1=4 and
￿
1 (2) = 1=3. So, in the region of parameters where ￿ 2 [1=3;1=2) the murk-up is 1=2 and full
collusion is still viable but it must be sustained by an ine¢ cient contract. Di⁄erently, below the
threshold ￿
1 (2) = 1=3, one has:
p(:) =











0 (2) = 1=4. Both the retail and the wholesale prices are increasing in ￿ in the relevant
range of parameters: more patient players can enforce implicit agreement sustaining larger retail
prices. Clearly, the larger is the collusive price the higher the wholesale price needs to be in order
22to refrain retailers from deviating. Finally, it is easy to show that in the range ￿ 2 (1=4;1=3)
both p(:) and w(:) are positive, with p(:) ￿ w(:), and the mark-up m(￿) = ￿=(1 ￿ ￿) is lower
than 1=2 and increasing with respect to ￿.
5 Private contracts
Suppose now that wholesale contracts are unobservable. The key di⁄erence with the case of public
contracts is that, in this framework, public deviations can no longer be distinguished by secret
ones. When bilateral negotiations are private, wholesale contracts loose their strategic value: a
deviation in contracts can no longer be detected instantaneously. Hence, the punishment phase
must start with one period delay under all circumstances.
The objective of the section is to show that this limit on retailers￿communication dramatically
sti￿ es the collusion possibility frontier ￿ i.e., it (discretely) increases the lowest discount factor
above which positive pro￿ts can be sustained in equilibrium. Before introducing the formal
analysis, it is worthwhile noting that also with private contracts the static game features a unique
competitive and e¢ cient equilibrium.
Lemma 5 Assume A1-A3. Then, with private contracts the stage game features a unique com-
petitive PBE. All players make zero pro￿ts, retailers symmetrically o⁄er C￿, set a retail price
equal to zero and uniformly share demand.
The intuition is straightforward. With private contracts the stage game G is one of imperfect
information. Retailers actually play a simultaneously move game where their strategy is to choose
independently a wholesale contract and a retail price. Hence, they cannot condition retail prices
on the observed contractual history of the game. Hence, since undercutting positive retail prices
was pro￿table in the regime with public contracts, by revealed preferences it must also be with
private contracts.
Once again, I shall focus on symmetric and stationary implicit agreements: retailers play sym-
metrically both in the cooperative and punishment phases. As before, I assume that the cartel￿ s
penal code follows Nash reversion trigger strategies, which in this case also imply minmaxing.
With private contracts the public history only contains information about past retail prices ￿
i.e., h￿ ￿ (p￿
i)N
i=1. Denote by ^ ￿ ￿ (^ ￿
￿ (h￿))
+1
￿=0 the collusive strategy which speci￿es for each
public history h￿ at stage ￿ a retail price ^ p￿ and wholesale contract ^ C￿. Moreover, denote by
y (h￿) 2 f0;1g the dichotomous state variable taking value 1 if after stage ￿ ￿ 1 the game is in
a cooperative phase ￿ i.e., all retailers obeyed to the implicit agreement up to ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ and 0 if
23a deviation has occurred before ￿. A stationary and symmetric collusion strategy enforcing the
non-competitive retail price pc and the wholesale contract Cc on the cooperative phase can be
thus formally described as follows:
8 ￿ and h
￿ 2 H






(pc;Cc) if y (h￿) = 1;
(0;C￿) if y (h￿) = 0:







The main di⁄erence with the previous analysis rests on the self-enforceability constraint.
Given (pc;Cc), self-enforceability here requires that no downstream ￿rm must ￿nd it pro￿table
to deviate by undercutting its rivals with a retail price slightly below pc and by issuing the best









c ￿ wi) ￿ Ti : D(p
c)wi + Ti ￿ 0g: (12)
There is one key di⁄erence between this self enforceability constraint and the one described in
equation (5) for the case of public contracts: when a downstream ￿rm deviates from the collusive
agreement and wholesale contracts are private, the best retail price it can charge is pc ￿ " (with
" > 0 and small enough). Since ￿rms cannot cannot react to public deviations, undercutting now
secures the largest possible pro￿t.
Using the participation constraint Ti = ￿D(pc)wi, the above incentive compatibility con-
straint rewrites as:
1




This leads to the following de￿nition:
De￿nition 6 With private contracts, an optimal symmetric and stationary collusive strategy








(p;C)2<3D(p)(p ￿ w) ￿ NT;
s.t. (3) and (13).
As before, the implicit collusive agreement has to maximize the downstream industry joint
24pro￿ts subject to the relevant participation and self-enforceability constraints. Using the partic-
ipation constraint T c = ￿(1=N)D(pc)wc in equation (13) it is immediate to see that wholesale
contracts play no role on collusion when these contracts are private. The next proposition for-
malizes this intuition:
Proposition 4 Assume A1-A3. Then, with private contracts collusion can be sustained only in
the region of parameters where ￿ ￿ (N ￿1)=N. In this range downstream ￿rms are able to sustain
monopoly pro￿ts (￿m) and o⁄er the competitive and e¢ cient contract. For ￿ < (N ￿ 1)=N, the
unique PBE of the repeated game features perfect competition and e¢ cient wholesale contracts.
Limits on retailers￿communication ability dramatically reduce collusion possibilities. If there
is no way of making wholesale contracts observable to rivals, deviation spot gains become so large
to prevent any scope for cooperation below the critical discount factor (N ￿ 1)=N. While with
public contracts retailers can avoid this moral hazard problem by changing instantaneously their
retail price in response to a public deviation, with private contracts this mechanism is no longer
viable.
6 The collusive value of communication
What is the link between the anticompetitive role of public contracts, ￿rms￿discount factor and
competition in retail markets where the bargaining power is on the retailers￿side?
My analysis o⁄ers a simple answer to this question. Taken together, the results stated in
Theorem 2 and Proposition 4 imply that public contracts broaden the collusive possibility frontier
as long as the downstream industry features a discount factor ￿ that falls short of the critical
value (N ￿ 1)=N. In this region of parameters, the possibility of making wholesale contracts
public leads to new collusive outcomes relying on ine¢ cient input supply. Hence:
Proposition 5 Since the threshold (N ￿ 1)=N is increasing in N, public contracts have a stronger
anticompetitive role for lower levels of ￿ and larger levels of N.
This result o⁄ers simple testable predictions on the link between the anticompetitive use of
wholesale contracts on the one hand, and the downstream market structure and retailers￿time
preferences on the other. Information sharing agreements between retailers should be more likely
to harm consumers in environments featuring a larger number of competitors in the downstream
market and/or more shortsighted ￿rms.
257 Extensions and robustness
So far the analysis was developed under few simplifying assumptions. First, I assumed that
the observability regime is exogenous ￿ i.e., retailers cannot choose whether to have or not an
information sharing agreement. Second, I considered only contracts involving two-part tari⁄s.
Third, in the regime with public contracts, I assumed that retailers never coordinate on equilibria
that do not satisfy weak Pareto-dominance in the punishment phase following a public deviation.
In this section I show that the qualitative insights of the previous analysis remain unaltered if
these hypotheses are weakened each in turn. Finally, I also discuss the reasons why, at least under
the assumptions made by the earlier literature on repeated interactions between upstream and
downstream ￿rms, my analysis seems more compelling for the ￿ buyer power￿case rather than for
the polar situation where the bargaining power is on the suppliers￿side.
7.1 Endogenous communication
Instead of assuming that contracts are (exogenously) either public or private, suppose now that
it is a decision of a retailer whether to make its contract public. Two di⁄erent scenarios can be
analyzed depending on the retailers￿commitment power. First, one can imagine that retailers
can commit to share information about wholesale contracts at the very outset of the game before
engaging in price competition, and if so, they cannot renege on this choice: full commitment.
Second, when retailers lack such long term commitment ability, they must decide whether to
disclose their contracts at each stage of the game: lack of commitment. Below I will analyze
each regime in turn. For obvious reasons, in both cases I assume that, once retailers decide to
communicate, it must be feasible for them to credibly disclose their wholesale contracts to rivals
￿ i.e., if disclosed, contracts are hard information.18
Full commitment. Assume that information is shared if and only if all downstream ￿rms
agree to do so, and that the cost of setting up such reporting system is negligible.19 Clearly, for
￿ ￿ (N ￿ 1)=N there is no need to share information, as shown in Theorem 2 and Proposition
4. Nevertheless, for ￿ < (N ￿ 1)=N retailers will ￿nd it optimal to share information if ￿ 2
[￿
0 (N);￿
1 (N)]. Hence, with full commitment retailers spontaneously share information whenever
this allows them to achieve a collusive outcome.
18Hard information is quantitative, easy to store and transmit in impersonal ways, and its content is independent
of the collection process. In this sense, a legally binding contract specifying the wholesale price wi and the franchise
fee Ti can be interpreted as hard information.
19Of course, if the individual (per retailer) cost of setting-up the information sharing system is too high, there
will be no communication whatsoever.
26Lack of commitment. Consider now the case where retailers lack commitment power and
must take their communication decisions on a period-by-period basis. Suppose that if at stage ￿
a retailer discloses its contract, rivals observe such information before choosing their ￿nal prices.
This form of voluntary information sharing expands the strategy space of game G: in addition to
choose a wholesale contract and a retail price, each downstream ￿rm must also decide whether
to disclose its contract at every stage of the game. The issue that I analyze below is whether, in
this extended game, there exists a self-enforceable collusive strategy with communication among
retailers.
To make this point in the simplest possible way, consider a strategy pro￿le with the same
features of that in De￿nition 4 and, in addition, suppose that each downstream ￿rm charges a
￿nal price equal to wc if not all contracts have been disclosed in stage ￿ and it o⁄ers the competitive
and e¢ cient contract C￿ and charges a retail price equal to zero from the next period onwards. As
one can easily show ￿ see, e.g., the proof of Theorem 2 ￿ this strategy enforces collusion on the
equilibrium path and contracts are made voluntarily public. This is because the self enforceability
constraints are the same as those characterized in Section 4. Indeed, not disclosing the contract at
all or disclosing a contract di⁄erent from Cc is pay-o⁄ equivalent for a retailer￿ s viewpoint in the
deviation phase. Hence, voluntary information sharing emerges endogenously as an equilibrium
of the extended game where downstream ￿rms choose non-cooperatively their disclosure policy
at every stage.
Of course, this result hinges on the somewhat natural hypothesis that wholesale contracts
can be credibly disclosed to rivals. The idea that ￿rms can credibly share information has been
made in the earlier IO and banking literature dealing with information sharing in oligopolies.20
In the case at hand, the idea that retailers can credibly share information about their wholesale
contracts seems reasonable in all circumstances where, to be legally binding, contracts need to be
recorded in a ￿ Public Registry￿or require veri￿able legal certi￿cations.
7.2 More general contract spaces
I have already discussed why in the region of parameters where ￿ 2 [￿
1 (N);(N ￿ 1)=N] simple
two-part tari⁄s allow to implement full collusion as long as wholesale prices are positive and
franchise fees negative. In this section I will explain why also in the region of parameters where
￿ < ￿
1 (N) more complex wholesale contracts, such as resale price maintenance and quantity
forcing contracts, cannot improve upon the allocation characterized in Theorem 2 under some
20See, e.g., either the IO literature on information sharing in oligopoly (Gal-Or, 1985, Raith, 1996), or the
banking literature stemming from Jappelli and Pagano (1993).
27natural conditions on the legal environment.
Resale price maintenance. One may reasonably wonder whether contracts imposing retail
price restrictions (RPM) broaden collusion possibilities in my game. Clearly, as long as the
law does not ban this form of contracts and there exists a credible mechanism which makes
this commitment reliable, the equilibrium will trivially feature full collusion. These contracts,
though, are often seen as anticompetitive: antitrust and competition policy authorities have
largely debated the opportunity of forbidding vertical price restrictions, and the recent attitude is
to ban them in almost all circumstances. Taking this legal view, my focus on the anticompetitive
nature of simpler two-part tari⁄s (typically seen as pro-competitive) seems more compelling.
Moreover, even if RPM contracts were not forbidden, but their enforceability would be limited
by moral hazard or (secret) renegotiation, the equilibrium characterization would boil down to
that presented in Section 4. Essentially, whenever there is no legal way to prevent a retailer from
announcing a strictly positive price pc and then charge pc ￿" at the expense of its competitors21,
the self enforceability conditions (4) and (5) remain the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
the existence of a collusive agreement.
Quantity forcing contracts. The same considerations made for RPM apply to quantity forcing
contracts. Were each retailer able to commit in a credible way to sell only 1=N-th of the monopoly
quantity, the equilibrium should lead once again to full collusion. It is hard, though, to imagine
legal rules allowing for this type of behavior. Contracts that enforce collusion in such an explicit
way should be forbidden by the antitrust authority. Moreover, even if public but non-binding
announcements about the amount of inputs that each retailer is going to purchase were allowed,
my equilibrium characterization would still remain the relevant one. Whenever there is no legal
way to prevent a retailer from announcing a capacity D(pm)=N and then secretly change its
contract so as to freely charge pm￿" and poach the whole market at the expense of its competitors,
the self enforceability conditions (4) and (5) studied before remain the necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for the existence of a collusive equilibrium.
7.3 Harsher punishments following a public deviation
So far, it was assumed that in the regime with observable contracts, following a public deviation
retailers never select equilibria that do not satisfy weak Pareto-dominance. This implies that if a
retailer deviates publicly by o⁄ering a wholesale price lower than wc, its rivals will charge a ￿nal
21This would be for instance the case when only public but non-binding recommendations about retail prices
are allowed.
28price equal to wc in the corresponding subgame. The deviant retailer will then charge a price
equal to wc ￿ " (with " > 0 and small) so that rivals will not sell, even though they gain the
sunk fee T c at the expense of their suppliers. Suppose, instead, that following such a deviation
the cheated ￿rms charge a price such that they make (overall) zero pro￿ts ￿ i.e., they charge the
price b p solving the following zero pro￿t condition:
1
N










Arguably, retailers should never price below b p in the punishment phase following a public devia-
tion: if so, given the sharing rule speci￿ed in (1) they would make negative pro￿ts as long as the
deviant rival mistakenly charges a price equal or larger than b p.22 In this sense such a price can








c ￿ 0: (14)
This punishment scheme simply implies that cheated retailers charge the lowest possible price
that would yield non-negative pro￿ts in a situation where each of them (including the deviant)
prices at b p(:) and get a share 1=N-th of demand. Of course, for (14) to hold, one must have
b p(:) < wc. Hence, public deviations become less pro￿table because the maximal pro￿t that the
deviant ￿rm can appropriate is approximately ￿(b p) when charging a retail price equal to b p ￿ "
(with " > 0 and small). In this case, the self enforceability constraints for collusion to be viable
rewrite as:
￿(pc)
















where ￿(b p(:)) < ￿(wc) since b p(:) < wc < pm. This shows that with such kind of behavior
following a public deviation, collusion may actually be sustained for a larger range of discount
factors than that characterized in Theorem 2. Hence,
Proposition 6 When public deviations are punished with the price b p(:), collusion can emerge in
a range of parameters larger than that characterized in Theorem 2.
Consider, for instance, downstream ￿rms wishing to enforce the monopoly price pm. Condition
22In this event, those retailers that were not expected to sell in equilibrium should rationally opt-out and refuse
to sell.
29(15) would then require:
￿(pm)
















Hence, the wholesale price (wm
b p ) that maximizes the range of discount factors where full
collusion is feasible solves:
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To show an example of how this works, consider the linear example studied in Section 4.2,
and assume for simplicity that N = 2. Recall that by (14) the price b p(:) solves:





















Coming back to (16), one can easily check that wm









= (1 ￿ b p(:)) b p(:);
yielding wm
b p ￿ 0:43 > wm and so b p(:) ￿ 0:17: Finally, the critical value of ￿ above which the
monopoly price can be still sustained (￿
1
b p (2)) solves
(1 ￿ pm)pm
2(1 ￿ ￿)
= (1 ￿ b p(:)) b p(:);
yielding ￿
1
b p (2) ￿ 0:12 < ￿
1 (2) ￿ 0:3. This example shows quite clearly that even if the ￿ minmax-
ing￿rule derived from (14) makes collusion easier to sustain, it cannot guarantee the monopoly
outcome at every discount factor ￿ 2 [0;1]. Hence, for low discount factors, competing retailers
will again need to rely on ine¢ cient collusion to sustain positive pro￿ts.
7.4 Bargaining power on the suppliers￿side
Finally, in this section I brie￿ y discuss how my results change when the bargaining power is
concentrated on the suppliers￿side. To this purpose, consider a game where, di⁄erently than
before, each supplier makes a take-it or leave-it o⁄er to its exclusive retailer. Suppose that
30contracts again feature two-part tari⁄s and that they are public. The timing is the same as that
in game G, with the di⁄erence that here suppliers propose contracts and retailers decide whether
to accept the o⁄ers received.
Following the literature dealing with upstream collusion ￿ see, e.g., Jullien and Rey (2007)
￿ I consider the case where suppliers are in￿nitely lived and discount future at the rate ￿ 2 [0;1],
whereas retailers are short-lived and just maximize their spot pro￿t ￿ i.e., they are too short-
sighted to collude at their level. In this game, because of Bertrand competition, every symmetric
pro￿le of wholesale contracts leads each downstream ￿rm to set its retail price equal to the
wholesale price ￿ i.e., pi = wc for all i as long as all suppliers o⁄er Cc ￿ (wc;T c). Hence,
upstream ￿rms can sustain collusion only by o⁄ering a contract Cc ￿ (wc;T c), specifying a
positive wholesale price (wc > 0). As before, I assume that following any deviation at stage ￿,
suppliers o⁄er the competitive and e¢ cient contract C￿ from the next stage onwards.
In this game the concepts of public and secret deviations are equivalent: anticipating its
retailer￿ s behavior a supplier can deviate from an implicit collusive agreement only by charging
a wholesale price slightly lower than wc. So, in order for collusion to be viable, the following
conditions must be satis￿ed:
(i) Since in the collusive phase pc = wc, the retailer￿ s participation constraint requires:
￿T
c ￿ 0: (17)
(ii) Suppliers must not gain by undercutting Cc ￿ i.e., Si cannot pro￿t from o⁄ering a contract
specifying a wholesale price equal to wc￿", with " > 0 and small enough. For this behavior
not to be convenient, the following incentive constraint must hold:
￿(pc)












Combining equations (17) and (18), it is easy to show that any price between competition
and monopoly can be sustained in equilibrium for ￿ ￿ (N ￿ 1)=N. However, since retailers will
never accept to pay a positive franchise fee, as implied by the constraint in (17), collusion cannot
occur below the threshold (N ￿ 1)=N. This leads to the following result:
Proposition 7 If the bargaining power is on the suppliers￿side and retailers are shortsighted,
even with public contracts collusion can only be sustained for ￿ ￿ (N ￿ 1)=N. Otherwise, only
the competitive and e¢ cient equilibrium exists.
31This shows that public contracts are more likely to enforce collusive agreements when the
bargaining power is on the retailers￿hand and that, precisely in these instances, negative franchise
fees might actually re￿ ect some form of implicit collusion going on. What is interesting, though,
is that while with buyer power collusion can be sustained by the e¢ cient contract C￿ in the region
where ￿ ￿ (N ￿ 1)=N, a positive wholesale price is always needed when the bargaining power is
on the other side of the market.
Clearly, the result shown in Proposition 7 may dramatically change when retailers are long-
lived and behave strategically vis-￿-vis suppliers. In this case the equilibrium outcome can exhibit
features similar to those described in Theorem 2 in the range of parameters where ￿ < (N ￿1)=N.
But, the way things work in this more complex game heavily rely on how the collusive surplus
￿(pc)=N is shared within each supply chain, and it also depends on whether the sharing rule
that would sustain collusion is itself self-enforceable. More precisely, to achieve collusion in this
environment, suppliers might want to reward retailers ￿ i.e., by committing not to extract a
fraction larger than ￿ of the total surplus ￿(pc)=N ￿ as long as they ￿ behave well￿by keeping
retail prices above marginal costs in the collusive phase, and punish them otherwise. Were this
possible, the same logic developed above would enforce collusion even below the critical value
(N ￿ 1)=N, as it can be seen from the constraint (18). However, in this scenario, one needs to be
careful: retailers might hold up suppliers by grabbing the ex ante side payment (1 ￿ ￿)￿(pc)=N,
and then undercut rivals ex post by increasing their individual demand up to D(pc), so as to
enjoy larger sales pro￿ts at the expense both of suppliers and rivals. This extra moral hazard
problem adds a source of complexity to my model that is certainly worth studying, but that goes
behind the scope of the current paper, whose main focus is on buyer power. I plan to address
this and related issues in future research.
8 Concluding remarks
Two main objectives have been pursued throughout the analysis. First, the model throws new
light on the hidden determinants of vertical contracting, and on the role that a careful design of
wholesale arrangements might play in softening competition in a dynamic framework with buyer
power. Ine¢ cient vertical contracting emerges as a mechanism to implement collusion among
retailers, building on the natural ￿ complementarity￿between retail and wholesale prices. When
collusion between retailers turns out not to be sustainable with e¢ cient wholesale deals, this
complementarity makes it advantageous for them to rely on ine¢ cient input supply provision in
order to squeeze the wedge between collusive and deviation pro￿ts, whereby weakening deviation
32incentives. In addition, pro￿table collusive market outcomes must be supported by wholesale con-
tracts featuring negative franchise fees, a practice intensely debated by antitrust and competition
policy authorities.
The second main insight of the paper is about the e⁄ect of communication between compet-
ing retailers on the set of collusive outcomes. Communication turns out to be fundamental to
strengthen cartels￿sustainability, although generating some e¢ ciency losses. Moreover, its col-
lusive value increases in environments where ￿rms are less patient the number of competitors in
the downstream market is larger.
33Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the class of symmetric equilibria of game G where downstream
￿rms share evenly ￿nal demand, o⁄er the same wholesale contract Ce ￿ (we;T e) and charge the
same retail price pe. Under the hypothesis that retailers select equilibria of the downstream game
according to weak Pareto-dominance, in the following steps I show that there exists a unique
equilibrium with such features where Ce = C￿ and pe = 0.
Step 1. There cannot exist a SPNE where pe > we > 0.
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that there exists a SPNE where pe > we > 0. In this
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Consider the following deviation: Ri o⁄ers Ce, but charges a ￿nal price pi = pe ￿ ", with "
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Hence, Ri can pro￿tably undercut pe and steal the entire market from its rivals. This provides
the desired contradiction. A symmetric SPNE must then necessarily entail pe ￿ we.
Step 2. There cannot exist a SPNE where pe = we > 0.
The proof is again by contradiction. Suppose that there exists a symmetric equilibrium such
that pe = we > 0. Consider the following deviation: Ri o⁄ers C￿ ￿ (0;0). Given such unexpected
o⁄er and the fact that franchise fees are paid up-front, in the corresponding competitive subgame







Dj (p)(pj ￿ pe) if Dj (p) > 0;
0 otherwise,
(A.1)
given the vector of prices p = (pi)N
i=1. Hence, it is straightforward to see that such a subgame
features a continuum of Nash equilibria. Each of these equilibria is identi￿ed by a pair of prices
(p￿i;pi) such that: pj = pe(Ce;Ci) 2 (0;pe] for all j 6= i, and pi = pe
i(Ci;Ce) ￿ ", with " > 0 and
small enough. However, using De￿nition 1, the unique Nash equilibrium that survives to weak
34Pareto-dominance is the one where pj = pe for all j 6= i and pi = pe ￿". Hence, focusing on such














which yields the desired contradiction.
Step 3. There cannot exist a symmetric SPNE where pe < we and retailers share evenly ￿nal
demand.
The proof of this result is straightforward. Suppose that there exists a SPNE where pe < we
and all retailers sell the same positive amount of ￿nal good. Given its rivals￿strategies, Ri would
then be better-o⁄by not selling at all ￿ i.e., by setting pi = pe+", with " > 0, instead of pi = pe.














for pe < we. A contradiction.
Step 4. There cannot exist a symmetric SPNE where all downstream ￿rms o⁄er Ce ￿ (we;T e),
with T e > 0, and charge a positive retail price pe.
The argument is by contradiction. Suppose that such an equilibrium exists. Since suppliers￿
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e ￿ " ￿ w
e);
for " positive and close enough to zero. Therefore, a pro￿table deviation for Ri would be to
announce Ce according to the equilibrium strategy, but then undercut pe. A contradiction.
Step 5. There exists a SPNE where all downstream ￿rms o⁄er C￿ ￿ (0;0) and set a retail price
equal to 0.
Consider the following pro￿le of strategies:
(i) Each downstream ￿rm i o⁄ers Ci = C￿;
(ii) Each downstream ￿rm i charges pi = 0 as long as there is at least another retailer who
o⁄ered C￿ or if minj6=i wj < 0; while it charges pi = minj6=i wj if wj > 0 for all j 6= i;
35(iii) Supplier i accepts Ci if and only if Ti ￿ 0 and
Ti + Di (~ p
e (C
e;Ci))wi ￿ 0;
where, from Section 4.1, recall that ~ pe (Ce;Ci) = (pe (Ce;Ci);pe
i (Ci;Ce)) is the retail price
vector in the Nash equilibrium satisfying weak Pareto-dominance of the subgame triggered
by the deviation Ci.
Showing that (i)￿(iii) identi￿es a SPNE is immediate. First, note that, given (ii), if all retailers
o⁄er C￿, the unique Nash equilibrium of the retail game is such that pi = 0 for all i = 1;::;N.
Hence, no downstream ￿rm can pro￿tably deviate by changing the retail price only.
I now show that no retailer can also pro￿tably deviate by o⁄ering a contract Ci 6= C￿. Given
(ii), no retailer can gain by o⁄ering Ci with Ti > 0. This is because Si￿ s participation constraint
would require wi < 0 and in the corresponding subgame pj = 0 for all j 6= i according to (ii).
Indeed, the maximal pro￿t that i can expect to make from the retail price game is ￿D(0)wi > 0,
but then to accept Ci supplier Si would require a fee
Ti ￿ ￿D(0)wi;
so that Ri￿ s (ex ante) pro￿t would be
￿D(0)wi ￿ Ti ￿ ￿D(0)wi + D(0)wi = 0;
implying that o⁄ering Ci is not pro￿table. Note that charging pj = 0 for all j 6= i satis￿es
perfection because this outcome is a Nash equilibrium of the game where at least two downstream
￿rms have zero wholesale prices.
Next, suppose that Ri o⁄ers Ci = (wi;Ti), with Ti < 0. This is also not pro￿table because Si
would refuse such an o⁄er according to (iii). This action is sequentially rational for Si. Given
(ii), Si￿ s participation constraint implies Ti ￿ ￿wiD(0) and thus wi ￿ 0. Hence, if Si would
accept a negative fee, given (ii), all retailers j 6= i will set pj = 0 and Ri will then gain by not
selling. Indeed, if Ri wishes to sell, it must charge a price pi = 0, in this case its total pro￿t
would be ￿(wiD(0))=N ￿ Ti that is clearly lower than ￿Ti. As a consequence, in the subgame
following such a deviation Ri would prefer not to sell, so that Si would make losses by accepting
Ci. So it is rational for him to refuse the o⁄er. Showing that for all retailers j 6= i setting pj = 0
satis￿es perfection is again immediate since this outcome is a Nash equilibrium of the game where
at least two downstream ￿rms have zero wholesale prices.
Perfection must be checked also in all other possible contractual histories ￿ i.e., for all possible
o⁄-equilibrium wholesale o⁄ers. Assume that Ci = C￿. First, if minj6=i fwjg < 0, retailer￿ s i
strategy satis￿es perfection from the argument above, and the same is true in all histories such
that minj6=i fwjg ￿ 0 and there exists at least another downstream ￿rm o⁄ering C￿. Finally,
consider the case where all retailers but i o⁄er a wholesale contract such that wj > 0 for all j 6= i.
In this case pi = minj6=i wj also satis￿es perfection because weak Pareto-dominance implies that
no retailer with a wholesale price wj > 0 will charge a price lower that wj.
Gathering steps 1-5 yields the result. ￿
36Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that all retailers o⁄er the e¢ cient contract C￿ along the equilibrium
path. A collusive equilibrium can then be sustained as long as the self-enforceability conditions
(4) and (6) hold. Since wc = 0, it can be easily veri￿ed that these two inequalities are met if
and only if ￿ ￿ (N ￿ 1)=N. Finally, since the self-enforceability is not met when all retailers
o⁄er the e¢ cient contract C￿ and ￿ < (N ￿ 1)=N, it is immediate to show that, in this region
of parameters, the unique SPNE of the game where retailers o⁄er the e¢ cient and competitive
contract C￿ at every stage entails zero retail prices. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2. Given De￿nition 4, increasing the wholesale price above wc cannot be
pro￿table for a deviant retailer. Consider then a public deviation where Ri o⁄ers Ci = (wi;Ti)
with wi < wc, given that Cj = Cc for all j 6= i. By De￿nition 2, there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium satisfying weak Pareto-dominance of the corresponding subgame that requires all
downstream ￿rms j 6= i to price at pj = wc while pi = wc ￿ ". Hence, since Si￿ s participation




c ￿ wi) + D(w
c)wi = ￿(w
c);
which concludes the proof. ￿
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof of this result is straightforward as explained in the text and is
thus omitted. ￿
Proof of Lemma 4. I will ￿rst show part (i) and then (ii).



































Next, observe that the function D(pc)(pc ￿ wc (N ￿ 1)=N) is strictly decreasing in wc and
positive at wc = 0 for any pc > 0. Moreover, the function ￿(wc) is strictly concave, it is equal
to zero at wc = 0 and features a unique maximum at pm. Since ￿(x) is single peaked, it must
then be the case that, for any pc > 0, there exists a unique threshold wc = wc (pc) < pc which




c (N ￿ 1)=N);￿(w
c)g;
whereby showing the result. Notice also that strict concavity of ￿(x) implies D0 (wc)wc+D(wc) >





D0 (wc)wc + D(wc)
D(pc)
6= 0;
which by the Implicit Function Theorem immediately implies that the function wc (pc) is contin-
uous and di⁄erentiable around any point pc < pm. ￿
Part (ii): In order to show this result one ￿rst needs to argue that as long as there exists a
collusive equilibrium featuring a (strictly) positive retail price in the region of parameters where
￿ < (N ￿ 1)=N, the collusive wholesale contract cannot be the e¢ cient one. The argument is by
contradiction. Suppose that there exists a collusive symmetric equilibrium where retailers charge
strictly positive retail prices and issue the e¢ cient contract C￿. Then, by the self enforceabil-
ity constraint (4) it is immediate to verify that secret deviations are always pro￿table, so that
there exists no implicit agreement which sustains a positive price. This, together with suppliers￿
participation constraint (which in equilibrium must bind) imply that if a collusive equilibrium
exists in this region of parameters, it must be either the case that wholesale prices are strictly
positive (with negative franchise fees) or strictly negative (with positive franchise fees). Suppose
that wc < 0, and take T c = ￿(1=N)D(pc)wc, then the self-enforceability condition (4) implies:
p
c1 ￿ N (1 ￿ ￿)
N (1 ￿ ￿)
+
wc (N ￿ 1)
N
￿ 0;
but this cannot be true in the relevant range of parameters. In fact, for pc ￿ 0 and wc < 0 the
above condition requires ￿ > (N ￿ 1)=1: a contradiction. Therefore, if a collusive equilibrium
exists it must be the case that wc > 0 and T c < 0. ￿
Proof of Theorem 2. To begin with, it is useful to rewrite the cartel￿ s program as:
P :
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
max(p;C)2<3 D(p)(p ￿ w) ￿ NT
s.t.
1
ND(p)w + T ￿ 0,
D(p)(p ￿ w) ￿ N maxf(1 ￿ ￿)D(p)(p ￿ w) + ￿T;(1 ￿ ￿)￿(w) + Tg,
Clearly, the suppliers￿participation constraint must be binding in the optimum, as otherwise
retailers could pro￿tably decrease the franchise fee or the wholesale price to gain higher pro￿ts.
Then, T = ￿(1=N)D(p)w. Substituting this term into the incentive constraint and the objective




















38The cartel program then amounts to ￿nd a pair (wc;pc) of retail and wholesale prices that
maximizes joint revenues ￿(p) subject to the self enforceability constraints.
Showing that for ￿ ￿ (N ￿ 1)=N the monopoly price is self-enforceable and is supported by
the e¢ cient contract C￿ is immediate and will thus be omitted. I will therefore focus on the case
where ￿ < (N ￿ 1)=N. The proof is developed in the steps below.
Step 1. For ￿ < (N ￿ 1)=N; pc > 0 implies wc > 0.
This fact can be easily shown by contradiction. Suppose that wc = 0 and pc > 0, then from
the self-enforceability constraints one has:
￿(p
c) ￿ N (1 ￿ ￿)maxf￿(p
c);0g = N (1 ￿ ￿)￿(p
c);
which cannot hold for ￿ < (N ￿ 1)=N.
Step 2. For ￿ < (N ￿ 1)=N, wc > 0 implies wc < pm.
The argument is again by contradiction. Suppose that wc ￿ pm and that pc ￿ wc (a condition
that I will check later), then strict concavity of ￿(x), together with the fact that ￿ < (N ￿ 1)=N
is equivalent to 1 < N (1 ￿ ￿), imply:
￿(p
c) ￿ ￿(w
c) < N (1 ￿ ￿)￿(w
c);
which is incompatible with (6).








See the proof of Lemma 4 part (i).
Step 4. For ￿ < (N ￿ 1)=N, the monopoly price pm can be sustained in a collusive equilibrium
for ￿ ￿ ￿
1 (N); with
￿
















The proof of this result requires to use step 3. Consider an equilibrium such that the monopoly
price is self enforceable even below the critical value (N ￿ 1)=N. For this to be true one must
have
￿(p



























By step 3 we know that there exists a unique value wm = w(pm) minimizing the right hand











so that the wholesale price that maximizes the region of parameters where (A.2) is met is precisely
wm. It then follows that the monopoly price can be sustained by way of the wholesale price wm
in the region of parameters where
￿ ￿ ￿




Clearly, by construction, below this threshold the monopoly price cannot be sustained. More-
over, it is easy to show that ￿
1 (N) < (N ￿ 1)=N. Indeed, for wc = pm it follows that
￿



















Step 5. For ￿ < ￿
1 (N) there exists a unique solution (p;w) 2 <2
+ of P which satis￿es the














The argument follows directly from the fact that for any retail price pc > 0, the cartel￿ s
optimal strategy implies wc = w(pc) in order to minimize the upper bound imposed by incentive
compatibility on the strictly concave objective function ￿(p). It then follows that the unique
positive solution of P must solve the system (A.3)-(A.4), which is equivalent to (9) and (10) in
the statement of the theorem.
It remains to verify that any collusive strategy must specify a retail price larger than the
wholesale price ￿ i.e., pc ￿ wc. The proof of this fact follows immediately from (A.4). Indeed, it
40is easy to check that for ￿ < (N ￿ 1)=N it must be:
(N ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)N ￿ 1
￿ 1;
so that pc ￿ wc.
Step 6. For ￿ close to zero, the unique solution of program P that is compatible with positive
sales must entail pc = wc = 0.
Consider ￿rst ￿ = 0. In this case, it is immediate to verify that the solution of the system
(A.3)-(A.4) yields pc = wc and pc 2 ￿ ￿ fp ￿ 0 : ￿(p) = 0g: Given A1 and A2, it is easy to
verify that ￿ ￿ f0;pg. Hence, the only price level compatible with positive sales is pc = wc = 0.
Next, I show that in a neighborhood of ￿ = 0 there cannot exist a collusive equilibrium with
positive price level, so that for sales to be positive one must have pc = 0. To prove this result
one needs to show how the implicit function pc (￿;N), which solves the system (A.3)-(A.4), varies




￿pc (￿;N)(D0 (wc (￿;N))wc (￿;N) + D(wc (￿;N)))
(1 ￿ ￿)￿(pc (￿;N);wc (￿;N);￿;N)
; (A.5)
where ￿(:) is the determinant of the Jacobian corresponding to system (A.3)-(A.4),
￿(:) =
￿









c (￿;N) + D(w
c (￿;N)))(1 ￿ N (1 ￿ ￿)):










D0 (p)(N ￿ 1)
2 > 0,
hence, around ￿ = 0 there will be no sales as long as one selects the price pc (0;N) = p. As a
consequence, positive sales around ￿ = 0 are compatible only with pc (0;N) = 0, where D(0) > 0
by de￿nition. This concludes the step.
Step 7. There exists a lower-bound ￿
0 (N) ￿ ￿
1 (N) such that for all ￿ ￿ ￿
0 (N), the unique
solution of P compatible with positive sales entails wc (￿;N) = pc (￿;N) = 0.
This result can be easily shown by noticing that at ￿ = 0 the solution of the system (A.3)-
(A.4) entails pc (￿;N) > p. Hence, for all ￿ close to 0 one must have pc (￿;N) = 0. Now, observe
that for ￿ ! (N ￿ 1)=N the system (A.3)-(A.4) yields wc = 0 and ￿(pc) = 0, implying once
again pc 2 ￿. Taking the solution with the highest price pc = p, substituting ￿ = (N ￿1)=N and

















D0 (p)(N ￿ 1)
> 0,
implying that pc (￿;N) < p for all ￿ close to (N ￿ 1)=N.
Observe that for any ￿ 2 (0;(N ￿ 1)=N) the solution of the system (A.3)-(A.4) is continuos
since the demand function D(p) is continuos. From step 6 it then follows that there must exist
a lower bound ￿
0 (N) < ￿




￿ 0 for all ￿ < ￿
0 (N).
Moreover, from step 6 it must also be 0 < pc (￿;N) < p for all ￿ > ￿
0 (N) and ￿ < (N ￿ 1)=N:
Finally, showing that when pc (￿ (N);N) ￿ 0 one also has wc (￿ (N);N) ￿ 0 is immediate from
the system (A.3)-(A.4).
Step 8: The price p is lower than pm for all ￿ < ￿
1 (N).
The proof of this claim is immediate and it follows from step 4: there cannot exist a zero-pro￿t
contract (w0;T 0) ￿ i.e., with w0D(pm) = ￿T 0 ￿ which allows to sustain the monopoly price pm
in the region of parameters where ￿ < ￿
1 (N).
Finally, the statement of the theorem follows from gathering the results demonstrated in steps
1-8. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider ￿rst the case where ￿ 2 (￿
0 (N);￿
1 (N)), the result follows
























(N ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)
2 < 0.
Since the mark-up mc is inversely related to the ratio w=p, that is, mc = 1￿w=p one immediately
gets that mc is decreasing in N and increasing in ￿ for ￿ 2 (￿
0 (N);￿
1 (N)).
Next, consider the region of parameters where ￿ 2 (￿
1 (N);(N ￿ 1)=N), in this range the










Clearly, since pm does not depend on ￿ by A2, the wholesale price wm is not a function of ￿
so that in the range of parameters under consideration the mark-up is invariant with respect to










where, from the strict concavity of ￿(x), it must be D0 (wm)wm+D(wm) > 0 so that @wm=@N <
0. This immediately implies that mc is increasing in N for all ￿ 2 (￿
1 (N);(N ￿ 1)=N). ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof of this result relies upon the characterization of the solution













This program immediately implies that the monopoly pro￿t can be sustained as long as
￿ ￿ (N ￿1)=N and that for ￿ < (N ￿1)=N the unique PBE of the game with private contracting
implies perfect competition. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof of this result simply follows from the fact that with public
contracting ine¢ cient collusion emerges in the region of parameters where ￿ < (N ￿ 1)=N. It is
then immediate to show that the critical value (N ￿ 1)=N is increasing in N. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof of this statement is immediate since for every wc ￿ pc ￿ pm
one has
￿(w
c) > ￿(b p(w
c;p
c));
Hence, (7) implies (15) but the opposite is not true. This provides the result. ￿
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof of this result immediately follows from equation (18).
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